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Recent theoretical approaches stress the importance of complex integration strategies 
of multinationals and the interdependence between locations. Up till now little has 
been done to incorporate the potential cross-country dependencies into the empirical 
analysis  of  the  determinants  and  the  structure  of  foreign  direct  investment.  By 
utilizing a panel data set that consists of real FDI stocks for 476 country pairs for the 
years 1994-2004  and  a  distance weighted spatial  matrix, we find significant  third 
country effects. Interestingly, the bilateral variables seem to be in concordance with 
the notion of horizontally motivated FDI while the spatial third country effects seem 
to  comply  with  the  notion  of  vertical  FDI  and  production  fragmentation.  While 
bilateral  variables  seem  to  dominate  location  decisions  the  results  confirm  the 
existence and importance of international interdependence.  
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 Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 





New Trade Theory and the theory of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) is spatial in its 
nature and, naturally, there exists a suspicion that the choice of location and the nature 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is not independent of the characteristics of the 
surrounding economies.  
 
Traditional theoretical models of FDI have been analyzed in a two country setting 
which  restricted  the  analysis  of  international/spatial  interdependence.  Empirical 
approaches  have,  by  and  large,  mirrored  theory  insofar  that  FDI  between  two 
countries  usually  depends  only  on  the  two  countries  in  question  and  where  the 
influence of the „rest of the world‟ is largely ignored. 
 
The recent theoretical literature has started to analyze international interdependencies 
in multi-country and multi-good settings, with each new model yielding interesting 
insights. These models clearly highlight the complex country/market interdependence 




While there is evidence that FDI in different locations may be complementary, little 
has  been  done  to  incorporate  the  potential  cross -country  dependencies  into  the 
empirical analyses of the determinants and structure of FDI. There are, however, some 
recent notable exceptions using spatial econometric approaches in order to examine 
FDI  behaviour.  Coughlin  and  Segev  (2000)   consider  US  FDI  across  Chinese 
provinces.  They  find  that  a  region‟s  FDI  is  positively  correlated  with  FDI  into 
neighbouring  regions  (a positive spatial  lag),  which is  attributed to  agglomeration 
economies. Two further papers, Blonigen et al. (2007) and Baltagi et al. (2007) find 
significant  spatial  relationships  for  US  FDI,  using  different  samples,  model 
approximations and methodologies.  
 
In this paper we use data on real outward FDI stocks. We have 17 countries of origin 
and 29 countries of destination, hence (17*28) 476 distinct country pairs, for the years 
1994-2004. Our approach is somewhat similar to Baltagi et al. (2007) insofar that we 
model  the  spatial  dependencies  on  the  independent  variables  as  well  as  the  error 
structure. Using maximum likelihood estimations proposed by Elhorst (2003) as well 
as the generalized moments (GM) estimator of Kapoor et al. (2007), we find strong 
evidence of spatial dependence in the determinants of FDI. The empirical findings 
support the existence of interdependent FDI with both horizontal as well as vertical 
interactions/motivations. As in Blonigen et al., the bilateral variables do not seem, in 
general, to suffer from omitted variables bias due to the exclusion of third country 
effects.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a quick review 
of recent theoretical approaches that emphasize third country effects on the location 
decision of FDI. Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical approach of spatial 
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interdependence while Section 4 presents the empirical model. Section 5 presents the 
main results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
1  Theoretical motivation  
 
Von Thünen (1826) showed how the tyranny of distance could be used as a tool for 
understanding patterns of production and how heterogeneity in production can arise 
from  homogenous  land  through  the  existence  of  transport  costs.  Relatively  more 
recently, it was Myrdal (1957) who raised the question of whether balanced regional 
development  is  an  automatic  process  and  what  policies  might  be  required.  These 
questions,  on  regional  development,  were  then  extensively  analyzed  by  Kaldor 
(1970).  Kaldor‟s  analysis  was  in  turn  given  a  more  rigorous  underpinning by 
Krugman (1991) in his „core-periphery model‟, which pioneered a whole new class of 
models, under the title of “new economic geography”. 
 
The “new economic geography” models feature both forces of agglomeration as well 
as forces of dispersion where the relative strength of these forces is determined by 
trade costs. As a rule, agglomeration forces are hump-shaped with respect to trade 
costs and, depending on the starting point, dispersion forces may dominate, hence 
lessening  the  tyranny  of  distance.  Nonetheless,  historically,  the  lowering  of 
transportation  costs  that  accompanied  technological  progress  has  reinforced 
economies of agglomeration, creating specialised large industrial centres. That trend 
may have changed, however, with the technological progress of the last two decades 
lowering, not only, transportation costs but also communication costs, leading to an 
increased importance of dispersion forces. 
 
Traditionally, the theory of FDI has distinguished between two forms of multinational 
activity. These are based on alternative reasons of why a firm might choose to locate 
production or other activities abroad (see, for example, Markusen [2002, pp.17-20]). 
Vertical  multinationals  are  firms  that  geographically  separate  various  stages  of 
production. Such fragmentation of the production process is typically motivated by 
cost considerations arising from country differences in technologies or factor prices.
2 
Horizontal multinationals, on the other hand, are firms that replicate most or all of the 
production  process  in  several  locations,  motivated  by  the  potential  savings  on 
transport and trading costs. In these models firms with headquarters in a home country 
produce final output in each country in order to serve the respective national market 
consumers.
3 These two modes of FDI have recently been successfully merged in the 
“knowledge-capital”  model,  which  provides  reasons  for  both  vertical  as  well  as 
horizontal motivations endogenously, giving the approach a much richer structure.
 4 
 
However, as Markusen and Venables (2007) point out, the above models of MNE‟s 
have  been  analyzed  in  two-country  settings.  Even  though  rich  insights  have  been 
gained, there are inherent limitations to this two-ness that rule out many interesting 
                                                 
2 For example, Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) model multinational firms that 
maintain their headquarters in one country but manufacture output in another in order to conserve on 
production costs. 
3 For example, models developed by Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Venables 
(2000). 
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and potentially important issues. Casual empirical observations has highlighted these 
limitations and stressed the need for a richer set of factors that determine the location 
and  nature  of  FDI.  Yeaple  (2003)  notes  that  the  UN‟s  World  Investment  Report 
(1998) identifies multinational enterprises that increasingly follow, what they term, 
complex  integration  strategies.  These  MNE‟s  follow  both  vertical  and  horizontal 
motivations blurring the lines between traditional economic determinants. In this vein 
Ekholm et al. (2007) note that US affiliates in 2000 exported 36 percent of their total 
sales.  Out  of  these  exports,  only  a  third  was  exported  back  to  the  US  (vertical 
integration), while two thirds were exported to other countries. Also, Feinberg and 
Keane  (2003)  report  that,  for  US  affiliates  in  Canada,  69  percent  follow  some 
hybrid/complex form of integration strategy. These observations have spawned a new 
set  of  theoretical  models  that  abstract  from  a  two-country  setting  and  allow 
researchers to analyze a wider variety of motivations for FDI and their potential inter-
dependencies.  
 
1.1  Theoretical Models 
 
Spurred by these casual observations, theoretical research abstracted from the two-
ness  in  order  to  obtain  a  richer  and  more  realistic  structure  of  firm  organization. 
Yeaple (2003) studies a model with two identical “Northern” countries and a third, 
“Southern” country. The firms‟ headquarters are in one of the Northern countries and 
the  firms  need  two  produced  inputs  to  assemble  differentiated  final  goods.  One 
component can be produced more cheaply in the North, the other in the South. All 
final goods consumption takes place in the North and shipping entails an “iceberg” 
transport cost that is a similar proportion of output for intermediate goods as for final 
goods.  As  usual  the  horizontal  motives  come  from  transport  costs,  while  vertical 
motives come from factor price differentials.  
 
In  the  analysis,  emphasis  is  put  on  the  conditions  that  must  prevail  in  order  for 
“complex multinationals” to  arise,  where a  “complex multinational” produces  one 
component in the South and the other in both Northern countries. The key to this 
complex integration comes from the fact that both horizontal as well as vertical FDI 
reduce the cost of serving markets in complementary ways. Having made a horizontal 
(vertical)  investment  and  hence  expanded  the  units  sold,  these  firms  gain 
proportionately  more,  in  terms  of  unit  cost  reduction,  by  undertaking  vertical 
(horizontal) foreign investment. The end result is that the optimal level of vertical 
(horizontal)  foreign  investment  will  depend  on  the  level  of  horizontal  (vertical) 
foreign investment. The mode of FDI in Yeaple‟s model depends on the initial level 
of transport costs. When the level of transport costs fall within an intermediate range 
complex integration strategies dominate other foreign investment strategies.
5 
 
Grossman et al. (2006), while keeping the three country setting and allowing for the 
separation of intermediate good consumption and assembly, take the analysis further 
                                                 
5  In  Yeaple‟s  model  of  symmetric  producers,  all  firms  adopt  the  same  integration  strategy  in 
equilibrium.  The  viability  of  the  four  different  organizational  forms  depends  on  factor-price 
differentials, shipping costs and the fixed costs of establishing subsidiaries in the North and South. 
Moreover, the level of FDI in one country depends on the characteristics and policies of its neighbours, 
and this dependence has important implications for the structure of FDI across countries. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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by departing from some restricting assumptions, in order to allow firms to face a 
richer array of choices. They allow for consumption of the final good in the South as 
well as the North. They allow for fixed costs and transport/trade costs that vary by 
type (intermediate good production or assembly) and, following Melitz (2003) and 
Helpman et al. (2004), they allow firms to be heterogeneous in terms of productivity.  
 
The key parameters used to describe an industry are the sizes of the transport costs for 
intermediate and final goods, the relative size of the fixed costs for different types of 
subsidiaries  and  the  share  of  the  consumer  market  that  resides  in  the  South.  In 
equilibrium, firms with different productivity levels may make different choices about 
their  organizational  form  and  hence  the  model  can  account  for  the  equilibrium 
coexistence of a variety of integration strategies within the same industry.
6 
 
In a similar vein  Ekholm et al. (2007 ) study a  model  with two similar Northern 
countries, each  with  a  firms‟  headquarter,  and  a  single  Southern  country.
7  Their 
purpose to present a simple model showing the conditions under which export -
platform FDI is likely to arise and the conditions under which sales to third countries 
dominate the affiliate‟s production. Each firm produces an intermediate good in its 
home country but may assemble its final output in one or more plants located in any 
or all of the countries. They explore two different settings: one, where all trade costs 
are symmetric among countries, and one, where a free-trade area exists between one 
Northern country and the South (hence non-symmetric trade-costs between countries). 
In the symmetric case, they find that export-platform FDI is supported for moderately 
low transportation costs for the intermediate product and moderately low unit cost for 
production in the South. In the asymmetric case, i.e. where one Northern country is 
inside a free trade area with the South and the other Northern country is outside, both 
firms become export-platform firms with a lowering of trade costs when serving the 
other northern market. However, a further lowering of trade costs causes the inside 
firm to conduct all assembly in the South, becoming a pure export platform. In the 
empirical analysis they conduct, they find strong support for export-platform FDI. 
 
Building on the export-platform setting, Markusen and Venables (2007) develop a 
multi-country model with two final goods where one good can be fragmented into 
component production and assembly and where countries differ in terms of trade costs 
and factor-endowments (and hence factor prices). This model generates both market-
oriented and export-platform activity, occurring simultaneously but for different sets 
of  countries.  Both  types  emerge  naturally  from  different  combinations  of  factor 
proportions and trade costs. The division of countries into those engaging in market-
oriented activity and those engaging in export-platform depends primarily on trade 
costs, while specialization in components or in assembly is determined primarily by 
factor endowments. In general, countries with a high capital to labour ratio act as 
parent countries while labour abundant countries act as hosts. Moreover, countries 
with high trade costs tend to have market-oriented investment while countries with 
low trade costs tend to have export-platform investment.  
 
Apart from above mentioned insights, there are some other quite interesting results 
that  feature  in  this  model:  First,  there  is  a  set  of  countries  that  lose  from 
                                                 
6 This is in keeping with the evidence reported by Hanson et al. (2001) and Feinberg and Keane (2003) 
7 Both Yeaple and Ekholm et al. assume that no consumption occurs in the South. This assumption 
reduces the number of considered cases by a large amount in both cases.  Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 
   
5 
fragmentation. Second, many countries respond to fragmentation by specializing and 
trading less since trade in final assembled products is replaced by trade in components 
Third,  lower  trade  costs  increase  trade  volumes  and  specialization,  and  the 
relationship between trade costs and trade volumes is non-linear for the world as a 
whole even without vertical specialization, while fragmentation further increases trade 
volumes in line with the findings of Yi (2003). 
 
The models presented briefly above, give an indication of the rich structure that may 
lead  to  spatial  interdependencies  in  FDI  location.  Most  of  these  spatial 
interdependencies seem to involve transport costs (that depend on distance among 
other things), market access issues, endowment differences and technology. In the 
empirical  approach  we  will  try  to  include  these  variables  in  order  to  address  the 
spatial interdependencies of FDI locations. 
2  Empirical approach 
2.1  The FDI Data 
 
In order to investigate locational/spatial interdependencies of countries‟ FDI, we use 
the real outward FDI stock from 17 countries of origin to 29 host countries for the 
period  1994-2004.  Bilateral  outward  stock  data  exist  for  the  EU15,  the  USA  and 
Japan. Hence these countries will act as countries of origin. However, if we confined 
our host country sample to these countries only, we would probably introduce a bias 
in the spatial behaviour.
8 Take for example European investment: since the US is such 
a large economy a lot of FDI will be directed towards the US, which also happens to 
be far away, hence distance would not seem to matter. The same would be true for US 
investment in Europe, which is predominantly to large countries. Apart from this we 
would actually miss out on some very important FDI host countries for both US and 
Japanese investment. In order to have a rich er structure in the data and to try and 
avoid spatial biases we include, admittedly in a somewhat arbitrary manner,
9 countries 
that a) are „close‟ to the US or Japan and b) that are important as host countries. These 
countries are, predominantly, low-cost, labour abundant countries, which should give 
us a „better‟ balance in terms of host countries that have „horizontal‟ and „vertical‟ 
motivation of FDI. 
 
2.2  Spatial Dependence 
 
Two problems appear generally in traditional econometrics when data have locational 
components in them. The first is spatial dependence between observations and the 
second  is  spatial  heterogeneity  in  the  relationships  modelled.
10  The easiest way, 
perhaps, to understand this is by invoking Tobler‟s (1970) 1
st law of Geography:  
 
                                                 
8 The advantage would be that one could double-check the figures. For example, USA‟s outward stock 
to Japan should be the same as Japan‟s inward stock from the USA.  
9 The countries chosen do represent more than 85 percent of world outflows as well as inflows. 
Appendix C lists the countries in the sample. 
10 In this paper we will deal with issues of spatial dependence and spatial autocorrelation leaving issues 
of spatial heterogeneity unaddressed. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
    6      
“Everything is related to everything else,  
but near things are more related than distant things.”  
Location and distance are important  determinants  of human geography  as  well as 
economic activity. These notions  have been formalized in  regional science theory 
where spatial interaction, spatial diffusion and spatial spillovers play a central role. In 
our specific case, it is probably true that many factors explaining FDI cannot be put 
explicitly in our models. It is also probable that many of these factors are strongly 
spatial  in  nature.  Take,  for  example,  country  boundaries,  which  are  often  quite 
arbitrary. It is very likely that two regions, one on each side of the border, have more 
in common than two regions within the same country that are distant. In the same 
spirit, countries that share borders often have many more similarities than countries 
that do not. These similarities can include legislative issues, bureaucratic organization, 
work ethics, familiar mentality concerning social interaction etc. It may also be that 
neighbouring countries tend to have similar structures of economic activity. These 
factors can cause a neighbouring country to be viewed as less risky, or preferable, to 
invest  in.  Hence,  spatial  effects  might  be  picking  up  these  potentially  omitted 
variables which have a strong spatial element in them. We would thus expect spatial 
dependence if we believe that socio-demographics, economic-, regional- or any other 
relevant activity has a spatial dimension. This spatial dimension can turn out to be an 
important and informative aspect of a modelling problem.  
 
In a model of the form Y= a+ XB+u we can have spatial spillovers, i.e. some form of 
spatial  dependence,  emanating  from  the  errors,  the  dependent  variable  or  the 
explanatory  variables.  The  functional  relationship  of  the  recent  theoretical  models 
concerning production fragmentation, and hence the interdependence of FDI location, 
imply  that  the  spatial  dependence  is  best  captured  if  we  model  it  through  the 
explanatory variables. Lastly, if Tobler‟s law holds, we would also expect that there is 
some coexistence of attribute value similarity and locational similarity. This implies a 
spatial dependence emanating from the model‟s errors (i.e. spatial autocorrelation) 
which we have to take into account.
11 
 
2.2.1  The distance weighted spatial expansion model 
This class of models where introduced by Casetti (1972, 1992). The approach allows 
us to ascribe different weights to observations based on their distance from a central 
place  of  origin.  It  is  a  suitable  way  of  modelling  the  phenomenon  that  reflects  a 
“hollowing out” or a decay of influence with distance from the central point. The 











                  1. 
Where: 
                                                 
11 The modeling of a spatial  dependent variable  would in our case capture some form of regional 
agglomeration effect. While this might be of interest in itself it will not tell us anything about the 
modes of FDI and in what specific way, if any, international interdependence exists. Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 
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Where  0   is a  1 * k  vector of parameters and where Wxn,: is the relevant weighting 
matrix for the variables of each spatial unit. This model is straightforward to estimate 
using least squares in the following form: 
 
        x x XW X y                 4. 
 
The only remaining issue one has to posit is what kind of expansion specification 




Traditional spatial analysis is conducted on static data with one central location of 
origin. Dealing with dynamic data and multiple locations of origin causes us to depart 
somewhat from these settings. Here, we will modify our spatial expansion in such a 
way  that  our  variables  of  interest  capture  not  only  spatial  dependence  but  are 
economically intuitive as well. In order to achieve this we will estimate a model of the 
form          z z xW Z X y ,  where  Z  is  a  set  of  explanatory  variables,  highly 
related to X, that will hopefully capture the spatial dependence caused by production 
fragmentation (if it exists) and that can be interpreted in an intuitive way. 
2.2.2  The spatial autoregressive error model 
In  the  spatial  errors  model  the  disturbances  exhibit  spatial  dependence.  This  is 
analogous to serial correlation problems in time series models and can be specified as:  
 






2 ; 0    





                5. 
 
The  spatial  econometric  literature  has  shown  that  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) 
estimation is inappropriate for models incorporating spatial effects.  In  the case of 
spatial error autocorrelation, the OLS estimator of the response parameters remains 
unbiased, but it loses the efficiency property.
13 The problems of OLS estimators  are 
                                                 
12 Given no spatial dependence x should not be significantly different from zero. 
13 In the case when the specification contains a spatially lagged dependent variable, the OLS estimator 
of the response parameters not only loses the property of being unbiased but also is inconsistent. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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commonly  overcome  by  using  maximum  likelihood  techniques.
14  From  Elhorst 
(2003), we can see that a demeaned log-likelihood function incorporating spatial error 
autocorrelation can be written in following form:  
 
     
 













1 ln 2 ln
2 
 
          6. 
where: 
          k t k t t X X Y Y W I e                   7. 
and where k can denote time, country pair, or any other variable specification one 
chooses to demean by. 
2.2.3  The  spatial  autoregressive  error  model  part  II.  The  GM-
estimator approach 
Apart from the maximum  likelihood techniques, recent  econometric  developments 
allow  us  to  model  spatial  correlation  through  generalized  moments.
15  The  GM-
estimator, which will be used as  a robustness check in our estimations,  is a random 
effects panel data estimator, able to accommodate  error components that are both 
spatially and time-wise correlated. We follow the arguments of Kapoor et. Al (2007) 
who demonstrate via Monte carol work that their GMM estimator performs in a way 
which is almost identical to the appropriate maximum likelihood estimator while 
being computationally much simpler and suitable for very large data sets or models. 
 
For the random effects model with temporal serial correl ation we augment (5) in the 
following way 
 
v I e t      ) (                   8. 
 
Where  v  contains  the  error  components  which  vary  across  N  and  T  and 
) , 0 ( ~ ) , 0 ( ~
2 2
v N v and N      
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Then the six moment conditions used are 
 
                                                 
14 See Anselin (1988) and Anselin and Hudak (1992).  
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Where     
2 2
1
2 T v    and Q0 and Q1 are as defined in Kapoor et al. 
 
Kapoor et al propose three GMM estimators for  1
2 2 ,    and v  the first estimator 
uses only the first three moment conditions and is really designed as a step on the way 
to the full GMM est imator, the second uses all six conditions and is the preferred 
estimator, the third uses a simpler weighting matrix and is computationally feasible 
for even very large N 
 
 
2.3  The Weighting Matrix 
 
A common practice of spatial models is to row-standardize the weight matrix. That is 
to normalize each of the weights in a row such that they sum to one. While it is an 
advantage from both a statistical and a computational standpoint, it may change the 
intended  “economic”  relationship  between  observations.  Our  multiple  locations  of 
origin implies that row standardization would distort the distance decay effect we try 
to capture. Instead, we give our weights an appropriate form by normalizing them 
through the minimum distance (min.dist) between two countries in our sample.
16 
 
Since our data consist of i=1 to n=17 countries of origin and for each country of origin 
(i)  we  have  j=1  to  k=28  countries  of  destination,  for  the  time  periods  
t=1994(1)…2004(T),    our  weighting  matrix,  following  Tobler‟s  1
st  law,  takes  the 
following form: 
 
                                                 
16 The row normalization approach would be relevant if we thought that a country is influenced by its 
neighbours and the importance of each neighbour is related to its relative and not absolute distance, for 
which there is no apparent reason. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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Where Wi,j,k is a 476*476 matrix and the complete weighting matrix W is a 5236*5236 
matrix.  
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Where (t) denotes time, (i) denotes origin, (j) denotes destination and (k) denotes 
destination other than (j).  
 
 
 Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 
   
11 
3  The Empirical Model 
 
The  empirical  modelling  strategy  uses  the  knowledge-capital  model  as  a  point  of 
reference which has the advantage of including both vertical as well as horizontal 
long-run motivations for FDI.
17 The model is augmented by the ratio of capital stock 
per head  as well as by spatial third country variables.
18 Our dependent variable is 
outward FDI stock deflated by host country producer price index. The bilateral 
determinants include the sum of the host and origin countries (GDP sum) , which is 
expected to be positive and with an elasticity greater than one. An index -variable 
measuring  how similar  the countries are  in terms of income   (Sim. Index)  is also 
included. The similarity index is expected to have a positive sign since it is measured 
as one minus the squared GDP shares of the country pair and ranges from 0 to 0.5 ; 
hence the more similar the countries are the closer the index gets to 0.5.
19 
 
The determinants also include measures of relative factor endowment such as capital 
and labor/human capital (Cap. Ratio and |Skill diff| respectively). The difference in 
capital  is  measured as  the share of real  capital per head  of the country  of origin 
relative to the host country. Intuitively, the larger this share, the more capital intensive 
the home country is and will hence make more investment. Thus we expect a positive 
sign  in  all  cases.  The  differences  in  human  capital  is  measured  as  the  absolute 
difference between the average schooling years for the population above 25 for the 
country of origin compared to the country of destination. Here a negative sign implies 
that countries similar in human capital endowments, invest more in each other, and 
tends to support horizontal motivations.  
 
The knowledge-capital model also includes two interaction variables. The first tries 
two capture asymmetries in size and human capital and is measured as the absolute 
value of skill difference * GDP difference (|GDPd|*|Skilld|). The second, as Carr et al. 
(2001)  put  it,  tries  to  capture  the  idea  that  trade  costs  may  encourage  horizontal 
investment, which is most important when relative endowments are similar. This is 





Trade costs for each country are included (Trade cost), measured as the inverse of real 
openness for each country. While trade costs for the parent co untry is expected to 
have a negative sign, the sign for  the host country will depend on the motivation for 
investing. Specifically, trade costs for the host country is expected to be positive given 
horizontal motivations, while it is expected to be negative given vertical motivations. 
Also included is measure of investment costs of the host country (Fin. Risk). This is 
                                                 
17 The capital-knowledge model, or some variation/expansion of it, has been used by a number of 
studies in order to estimate FDI determinants. See for example Carr et al. (2001), Markusen (2002, ch. 
12), Markusen and Maskus (2002), Blonigen et al. (2003) and Blonigen and Davies (2004). However, 
we do not test for any model in particular, whether this concerns the horizontal, the vertical or the 
knowledge-capital model. 
18 See Bergstrand and Egger (forthcoming) for the motivation for including this ratio. The ratio is also 
used in Baltagi et al. (2007). 
19 See Baltagi et al. (2003) and (2007). 
20 Blonigen and Davies (2004) note that these interaction terms once logged, become collinear with the 
main control variables. They choose to drop them while we choose to keep them in a level form. Their 
inclusion in level form does not affect the other explanatory variables. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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measured as the inverse of the financial risk index from the International Country 
Risk Guide and is expected to affect FDI negatively. The final bilateral variable we 
include  is  great  circle  distance  between  capitals  as  a  proxy  for  distance  between 
countries (dist) and is expected to have a negative effect on FDI. 
 
The spatial interaction effects are for differences between the host country   j  and all 
other  host  countries    j k    in  the  sample  when  they  are  expressed  as  a  pair 
relationship. Alternatively, they concern only all other    j k   host countries when 
the  spatial  variable  is  not  expressed  as  pair  relationship.  Finally,  the  spatially 
interacted variables are only for a subset of above bilateral variables.
21 These include 
measures of market access (W GDP)  measured by surrounding markets  real GDP, 
weighted by distance. Trade costs of the distance weighted third countries (W Trade 
cost h.) and distance weighted  factor endowment variables (W Cap. Ratio and W 
|Skill diff|). The spatial factor endowment variables are measured as the host country 
value (which takes the place of the country of  origin in the bilateral part of the 
specification) relative to the value of all other distance weighted host countries.
22 
 
From previous research, we expect that horizontal motivations for FDI will tend to 
dominate, at least the bilateral variables.
23 However, assuming that the MNE organize 
themselves such that they form supply chains and fragment their production, the 
spatial interaction variables should be consistent with  some vertical motivations of 
FDI. In our case this means that W Cap. Ratio and W |Skill diff| are expected to have 
a positive sign and W Trade cost h . a negative one.  Surrounding market GDP (W 
GDP) is expected to, at least, not be negative, while the effect of W Sim. Index is 
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. h cost    Trade . ln diff   Skill ln Cap.Ratio . ln Sim.Index . ln
GDP . ln distance ln | skilld | * | GDPd | skilld * . Tradech
. | diff   Skill | ln Fin.Riskh ln costo   Trade ln . costh   Trade ln
Cap.Ratio ln Sim.Index ln GDPsum ln FDI ln
  
   
    
 
The  coefficients  ()  refer  to  bilateral  variables  while  (c)  refer  to  third-country 
weighted variables respectively. The term  ijt u  varies in form depending on whether 
we estimate OLS or a spatial error model with ML- and GM- techniques. The latter 
two will have an error coefficient  that captures the spatial autocorrelation. 
 
                                                 
21 Some of the independent variables do not have a clear economic interpretation if they are included in 
the spatial expansion. 
22 For the factor endowment variables, the third country effects are created as follows: First, we create a 
distance weighted variable for all other host countries. This variable in turn is used to create a ratio or 
difference relative to the host country‟s endowment in the bilateral observation. The other variables are 
straight forward distance weighted observations of all other host countries. See also Appendix C. 
23 See for example Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Baltagi et al. (2007). Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 
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4  Results 
 
Naturally, one would prefer to estimate a model with as few restrictions imposed as 
possible. In our case this implies a two-way fixed effects modelling. However, given 
most information comes from cross-sectional differences (476 country pairs) and not 
time  (11  years),  we  are  ambivalent  to  this  approach,  since  it  eliminates  the 
information from cross-country differences. As economists we are interested in the 
economic determinants that drive FDI. It will thus not be an interesting economic 
approach, even if it is econometrically correct, to say that mostly the results depend 
on unobserved country characteristics.
24 Apart from the interpretation issue, our data 
consists of heterogeneous panels and if we estimate a fixed effect model it will bias 
our coefficients towards zero.
25 Given these issues we will instead use the between 
estimator, which captures long-term relationships, as  a guide, when we restrict our 
model. 
 
Table 1 presents some base results, of the spatial expansion approach,  concerning the 
determinants of outward FDI. Model 1 is our between estimator (BE) which acts as a 
guide. Here we see that b oth GDP sum as well as t he Sim.Index are positive and 
significant.  In accordance with priors these t wo variables support the notion of 
horizontal motivations for FDI. However, for the bilateral variables host country trade 
costs appear to be negative and significant, lending supp ort to vertical motivations. 
Distance  is  as  expected  negative  and  highly  significant,  while  surprisingly  the 
financial risk index for the host country appears positive and significant, contrary to 
expectations.
26 Most importantly though, all third country v ariables are significant. 
The weighted GDP of other host countries, which captures market access, is positive 
and significant. The weighted similarity index, capital ratio, skill differences as well 
as trade costs are all significant and their signs are in  line with notion of production 
fragmentation.  
 
------ Table 1 about here ------ 
 
 
Model 2 is a random effects (RE) estimation, which is a cross product of, the fixed 
effects (FE, Model 3) estimator and the between estimator.
27 In both Model 2 as well 
as 3, we have one intercept per country pair. This limits severely the time variation of 
our explanatory variables.
28 Focusing on the fixed effects model, we see that for the 
third country variables only the weighted capital r atio appears to be significant, 
                                                 
24 Due to the limited time-series, when we demean the data, or estimate the dummies, there is not 
enough time variation left in our explanatory variables. However, the fixed do capture other omitted 
variables.  The  econometric  “incorrectness”  of  restricting  the  country  dummies  is  verified  by  the 
rejection of these restriction from F- and LR-tests. See Appendix B. 
25 See Pesaran and Smith (1995). Also, there are not enough time observations in order to obtain pooled 
mean group estimators.  
26 This could be due to the fact that the financial risk index is a short-term variable in itself, while in the 
Between estimations we capture long-term trends. When we allow for time variation in our regressions 
we see that the variable becomes invariantly negative. 
27 From the relevant R
2 it is obvious that most explanatory power comes from differences between 
countries.  
28  One indication is that our level variables, which exhibit a larger time variation, appear to be 
significant. This significance is curtailed when we restrict our dummy variables in Models 4 and 5 and 
allow more time variation in the other explanatory variables. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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contrary to the results obtained from the Between estimator. Trying to allow for more 
variation in our data means that we need to restrict the dummy variables and set many 
of them to zero. This is done in Model 4 where dummies for the countries of origin as 
well as dummies for the host countries are included and in  Model 5,  where only 
dummies for the host countries are included. The results from Model 5 are more or 
less in line with the results from the between estimator, and hence Model 5 constitutes 
our preferred estimation. 
 
In  Model  5,  the  implicit  assumption is  the  countries  of  origin  are  assumed  to  be 
homogenous. We can ask ourselves whether it is logical not to include dummies for 
countries of origin, which implies that outward FDI is similar irrespective of which 
country actually invests. With a little good will we believe it is. Firstly, we have 
aggregate data. Secondly, investing countries are developed, hence the motivations 
would be similar across them.
29 Also, the investing countries, are on, or almost on, the 
same technological frontier. The   host countries though,  differ from each other in 
terms  of  several  characteristics,  such  as  legal  origin,  labor  market  regulations, 
language, number of neighbo urs, level of development  etc., and hence we should 
control for unobserved host country characteristics. 
 
However, for our main purpose here,  all models, some more than others, indicate 
significant third country effects. Focusing on our preferred model ( Model 5), we see 
that the bilateral variables are consistent with the notion of horizontally -motivated 
FDI (l GDP sum, l Sim. Index >0, l |Skill diff.|<0). The third country variables , 
however,  indicate  strong  spatial  interdependencies .  The  positive  and  significant 
estimates  of  our  w eighted  factor  endowment  variables  as  well  as  the  negative 
significant  effect  of  the  weighted  trade  costs  are  consistent  with  production 




The results are consistent with the following notion. If, for example, a US firm were 
to invest in Germany, it would be a horizontal investment (final good assembly). This 
investment could not only act  as a base for sales both in Germany but also in the 
surrounding countries. The US firm would also invest in „cheaper‟ countries close by 
that would serve the German affiliate with intermediate products. Conversely, if a 
European  company  was  to  invest  in  the  Americas  they  would  make  a  horizontal 
investment in the US and use that as their sales base, while they would serve their US 
affiliate with intermediate products from other FDI located in Canada and/or Latin 
America, creating in this way regional supply chains. 
 
Finally, comparing Models 5 and 6, we can infer two things. Even if third country 
effects  are  important,  the  location  decision  of  FDI  is  dominated  by  bilateral 
considerations; these bilateral estimations are not very prone to miss-specification. 
                                                 
29 It would be a problem if China was included as an investor form example, since China‟s investment 
would probably concern raw materials and would hence be  quite different from Germany‟s or the 
USA‟s. Concerning the „poorer‟ investors of our sample like Greece and Portugal, we can point out that 
their investment is so insignificant that it does not matter whether we include them or not. Actually 
these „poorer‟ countries are also responsible for the large majority of the missing data. 
30 We can see that the two interaction variables are significant in the fixed effects specification. This is 
due to the fact that they appear in levels and thus show a larger time variation than the logged variables. 
When we move away from the fixed effects specification, which allows our logged variables a „larger‟ 
time variation, they tend to become insignificant. Spatial Interdependencies of FDI Locations: A Lessening of the Tyranny of Distance? 




------Table 2 about here------ 
 
------Table 2A about here------ 
 
Table  2  adds  some  further  spatial  dependence,  namely  spatial  autocorrelation. 
Comparing the results of the simple spatial expansion model, estimated by OLS, with 
the results obtained from the SEM-model, that are obtained by maximum likelihood 
estimation,  we  see  that  the  point  estimate  ()  of  our  spatial  error  variable  is 
significant, albeit low, for the Models 3 and 5.
31 The point estimates of our other 
explanatory variables seem to be robust even in the presence  of significant spatial 
autocorrelation in the errors.
32 In Table 2A, we row normalize the weighting matrix 
for the errors and compare the results with th ose of the preferred non-normalized 
matrix.  As expected the coefficients for the bilateral and third cou ntry variables 
remain  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  similar,  while  the  results  for  spatial 
autocorrelation do not. This can be seen in (), where the point estimates of spatial 
autocorrelation are inflated and display a much larger significance, confirming the 
suspicion that whether we normalize our weights or not does matter. 
 
----Table 3 About here--- 
 
Finally, as an extra robustness check, Table 3 compares the estimation of our random 
effects model with the GM-estimator developed by Kapoor et al. (2007). Here the 
changes are more pronounced when we allow the errors to be both spatially and time-
wise  correlated.  The  variable  measuring  surrounding  market  potential,  W  GDP, 
becomes significant  and positive which is  in  line with  predictions and the results 
obtained by the MLE. However, the variable measuring bilateral capital endowment 
becomes  negative  and  significant,  which  is  surprising.  One  possible  explanation, 
considering our sample, could be that countries with lower capital per head try move 
closer  the  technological  frontier  through  acquisition.
33  For  example,  Sweden‟s 
willingness  to  invest  in the US  in order to  acquire technology  is  larger than US‟ 
willingness to invest in Sweden because it is a richer country. Another surprise is the 
coefficient on the variable measuring investment cost for the host countries, Fin.Risk 
host,  which  is  positive.  This  conundrum  does  not,  however,  affect  our  remaining 
results when we drop the variable in question for a more parsimonious estimation 
(Table 3A). The weighted third country variables in the GM-estimations also support 
the notion of production fragmentation, not only for the variables measuring factor 
endowment just like the ML-estimations. We can also compare our results from Table 
3 with the results from Table 3A, where we row-standardize our weighting matrix. As 
                                                 
31 The low spatial autocorrelation estimate is due to the spatial expansion and the inclusion of country 
dummies (or the demeaning). The initial spatial autocorrelation without these is in the range of 0.5.  
32 In Table 2 and 2a, we do not use dummies to control for country characteristics. Instead we demean 
the data by the relevant variables and run our regressions on the demeaned data, thereby getting rid of 
potential dummy endogeneity. 
33 All the investing countries are developed, hence their capital endowments are still relatively close. 
We can also note that when only bilateral variables are used, the effect of the capital endowment ratio 
is positive and significant, both in the random effects as well as the GM -estimation. Hence the 
exclusion of third country variables can induce severe errors in our estimations. By: Stephen G. Hall & Pavlos Petroulas 
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in the MLE case, the implied spatial dependence is inflated confirming again our 
suspicion that issues of normalization matter.  
 
In general, the estimations seem to indicate horizontal bilateral motivations dominate 
the reasons for investing in a host country and the magnitude of the coefficients is 
reasonably in line with prior research. However, third country effects that are both 
vertically motivated, but also seem to be important as final good consumers seem to 
play an important role. These results hold irrespective of methodology chosen and are 
robust in their support for significant third country effects and the existence of spatial 
interdependence of FDI locations.  
 
5  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper has been the investigation of the existence and nature of 
spatial (inter)dependencies of FDI locations. We have used a large set of country pair 
data  on  real  outward  FDI  stocks,  covering  a  large  majority  of  world  FDI.  By 
modelling spatial dependencies emanating both from the explanatory variables and 
the errors, and using both maximum likelihood and general moments estimations, we 
find that the notion of spatial dependence of FDI locations is strongly supported. 
  
To  wit,  FDI  is  mainly  driven  by  bilateral  determinants  that  support  horizontal 
motivations while third country effects tend to support vertical motivations, both in 
terms of the results with respect to third country factor endowments and trade costs. 
The results are in line with the notion of MNEs forming regional supply chains of 
production, where the third country determinants act as complements to bilateral FDI. 
The additional finding that surrounding market potential is important increases the 
complexity  of  these  interdependencies.  These  results  support  the  existence  of 
complementary FDI, indicate that the tyranny of distance has probably lessened and 
that forces of dispersion have increased in importance. As in Blonigen et al. (2007) 
the bilateral estimation does not seem to be grossly mis-specified by the exclusion of 
spatial dependencies, since the coefficients on the bilateral determinants are, mostly, 
quantitatively similar .  
 
Finally, as in the theoretical literature, so also in the empirical field the spatial nature 
of the “New Economic Geography” and the theory of Multinational Enterprises need 
to  be  explored  further.  Moreover,  theoretical  models  that  are  easily  implemented 
empirically need to be developed in order to give clearer directions about potential 
spatial relationships. 
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Table 1: OLS Regressions on Outward FDI Stock, Spatial Expansion. Dependent Variable: Log of Real Outward FDI. 1994-2004 












Bilateral Variables                         
l GDP sum  2.86***  (7.86)  3.13***  (11.57)  4.37**  (2.70)  2.94  (1.34)  4.72***  (37.43)  4.20***  (36.12) 
l Sim. Index  1.15***  (3.27)  0.98***  (3.20)  0.35  (0.31)  1.28  (1.18)  2.14***  (20.19)  2.13***  (20.74) 
l Cap.Ratio.  -0.28  (1.14)  -0.08  (0.40)  0.90  (1.24)  0.02  (0.02)  0.61  (0.73)  3.53***  (18.85) 
l Trade cost host  -0.98*  (1.68)  -1.01***  (3.28)  -0.77*  (1.87)  -0.71  (1.17)  -0.80  (1.22  -0.74  (1.14) 
l Trade cost orig.  -0.72  (1.36)  -0.60  (1.44)  -0.60  (0.70)  -2.64*  (1.88)  -2.43***  (11.63)  -2.61***  (14.62) 
l Fin. Risk host  6.22***  (3.45)  -0.31  (0.86)  -0.63  (1.59)  -1.09*  (1.72)  -0.98  (1.50)  -1.17*  (1.80) 
l |Skill diff.|  0.24  (1.24)  -0.08  (0.90)  -0.10  (0.98)  -0.13**  (2.53)  -0.14**  (2.57)  -0.14**  (2.38) 
Tradech*skilld
2  0.35  (0.49)  0.97***  (2.89)  1.03**  (2.14)  -0.45*  (1.89)  0.09  (0.38)  -0.10  (0.42) 
|GDPd|*|Skilld|  1.9 e
-07  (0.73)  -5.5
-08**  (2.47)  -1e
-07**  (2.58)  -2e
-09  (0.24)  2.9 e
-09  (0.38)  -4.8 e
-09  (0.64) 
l distance  -1.40***  (5.20)  -1.81***  (7.13)  --  --  -1.08***  (6.43)  -1.28***  (8.51)  -0.96***  (11.25) 
                         
Weighted Third Country Variables                       
l W GDP   2.38**  (2.38)  0.54  (0.88)  0.63  (0.24)  5.03***  (6.89)  6.04***  (8.52)     
l W Sim. Index  -0.63*  (1.66)  -0.86***  (2.66)  -1.11  (1.00)  -3.21***  (3.57)  -3.42***  (3.64)     
l W Cap.Ratio  2.18***  (3.42)  3.85***  (8.52)  3.98***  (3.16)  4.14***  (2.73)  2.85***  (3.56)     
l W |Skill diff.|  0.81***  (4.23)  0.30***  (3.25)  0.16  (0.14)  0.12  (0.90)  0.39***  (2.62)     
l W Trade cost host  -3.03**  (2.07)  1.25  (1.48)  0.34  (0.25)  -5.76***  (3.29)  -0.62***  (3.65)     
                         
Obs.  3577  3577  3577  3577  3577  3577 
R
2   0.52  0.31  0.08 /(0.86)  0.60  0.53  0.51 
rho (variance due to ui)    0.82  0.93       
F-stat      49.08 (448)   78.8 (69)  75.9 (53)  78.8 (48) 
             
Note: Time and country dummies included but not reported. Absolute robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance in the 10-5 and 1% -level respectively 
The R squared varies depending on estimation method. The between (model 1), overall (model 2), within (model 3) and adjusted (model 3-6) is used.  
    
   
Table 2: Demeaned Regressions on Outward FDI Stock, Spatial Expansion and Spatial Error Model.  
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Outward FDI. 1994-2004 
  Demeaned Spatial Expansion Estimations (OLS)  Demeaned MLE Estimations: Spatial Error Model 
  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Bilateral Variables                                 
l GDP sum  4.51***  (3.63)  2.47***  (2.95)  4.71***  (37.61)  4.20***  (36.32)  4.89***  (5.21)  2.49***  (3.93)  4.93***  (42.66)  4.53***  (39.74) 
l Sim. Index  0.42  (0.43)  1.11**  (2.72)  2.14***  (20.25)  2.13***  (20.85)  0.72  (0.99)  1.12***  (3.61)  2.22***  (25.75)  2.20***  (26.29) 
l Cap.Ratio.  0.93  (1.38)  0.31  (0.43)  0.60  (0.73)  3.53***  (18.96)  1.19**  (2.41)  0.34  (0.63)  0.86  (1.44)  3.47***  (18.85) 
l Trade cost host  -0.77**  (2.01)  -0.49  (0.90)  -0.74  (1.14)  -0.73  (1.14)  -0.85**  (3.08)  -0.51  (1.24)  -0.77*  (1.66)  -0.71  (1.52) 
l Trade cost orig.  -0.63  (0.84)  -1.12  (0.88)  -2.39***  (11.59)  -2.61***  (14.70)  -0.54  (0.83)  -1.15  (1.18)  -2.81***  (15.59)  -3.22***  (19.11) 
l Fin. Risk host  -0.62  (1.70)  -1.25**  (2.13)  -1.03  (1.58)  -1.17*  (1.82)  -0.62**  (2.36)  -1.23***  (2.81)  -0.99**  (2.10)  -1.04**  (2.23) 
l |Skill diff.|  -0.10  (1.05)  -0.13**  (2.39)  -0.15**  (2.58)  -0.14**  (2.39)  -0.11  (1.60)  -0.13**  (3.14)  -0.13***  (3.11)  -0.13***  (3.00) 
Tradech*skilld
2  1.04**  (2.31)  -0.45*  (1.88)  0.09  (0.37)  -0.10  (0.42)  1.18***  (3.61)  -0.45**  (2.50)  0.04  (0.24)  -0.10  (0.55) 
|GDPd|*|Skilld|  -1e
-07 **  (2.78)  -3.4e
-09  (0.41)  2.3e
-09  (0.31)  -4.8e
-09  (0.65)  -7e
-08***  (3.62)  -3.3e
-09  (0.52)  -2.2e
-09  (0.40)  -8.7e
-09  (1.51) 
l distance      -1.33***  (11.28)  -1.31***  (8.84)  -0.96***  (8.84)      -1.34***  (15.02)  -1.61***  (12.44)  -1.16***  (14.90) 
                                 
Weighted Third 
Country Var. 
     
                         
l W GDP  0.92  (0.51)  4.58***  (6.89)  5.86***  (8.41)      0.66  (0.50)  4.61***  (9.20)  5.43***  (10.41)     
l W Sim. Index  -1.18  (1.23)  -1.95**  (2.84)  -3.40***  (3.64)      -1.23*  (1.77)  -1.97***  (3.78)  -3.25***  (4.77)     
l W Cap.Ratio  3.98***  (3.37)  2.92**  (2.68)  2.86***  (3.59)      3.48***  (3.69)  2.87***  (3.47)  2.79***  (4.69)     
l W |Skill diff.|  0.02  (0.17)  0.20  (1.60)  0.38**  (2.62)      -0.03  (0.33)  0.20**  (2.15)  0.31***  (2.96)     
l W Trade cost host  0.51  (0.42)  -2.07  (1.52)  -5.86**  (3.37)      0.54  (0.60)  -2.15**  (2.08)  -4.13***  (3.09)     
Spatial autocorr. ()                  0.09***  (8.56)  0.01  (0.62)  0.15***  (21.35)  0.16***  (22.49) 
                                 
R
2  0.02  0.07  0.45  0.43  0.26  0.23  0.58  0.57 
F-stat/LL  6.9  18  194  270  -7743  -11791  -12243  -12313 

2          1.51  5.23  5.61  5.80 






      
Table 2A: Demeaned Regressions on Outward FDI Stock, Spatial Expansion and Spatial Error Model, Different Weighting Matrices. 
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Outward FDI. 1994-2004. 
  Demeaned MLE Estimations: Spatial Error Model 
W is row normalized 
Demeaned MLE Estimations: Spatial Error Model 
W is not row normalized 
  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Bilateral Variables                                 
l GDP sum  5.22***  (5.53)  2.65***  (3.82)  4.91***  (27.09)  4.45***  (25.71)  4.89***  (5.21)  2.49***  (3.93)  4.93***  (42.66)  4.53***  (39.74) 
l Sim. Index  1.19  (1.63)  1.18***  (3.49)  2.23***  (20.38)  2.16***  (20.73)  0.72  (0.99)  1.12***  (3.61)  2.22***  (25.75)  2.20***  (26.29) 
l Cap.Ratio.  1.33***  (2.68)  0.37  (0.68)  0.64  (1.14)  3.14***  (11.79)  1.19**  (2.41)  0.34  (0.63)  0.86  (1.44)  3.47***  (18.85) 
l Trade cost host  -0.83***  (3.02)  -0.57  (1.39)  -0.62  (1.40)  -0.40  (0.90)  -0.85**  (3.08)  -0.51  (1.24)  -0.77*  (1.66)  -0.71  (1.52) 
l Trade cost orig.  -0.51  (0.76)  -1.06  (0.96)  -2.75***  (10.08)  -3.16***  (12.30)  -0.54  (0.83)  -1.15  (1.18)  -2.81***  (15.59)  -3.22***  (19.11) 
l Fin. Risk host  -0.57**  (2.14)  -1.13**  (2.57)  -0.71  (1.58)  -0.68  (1.53)  -0.62**  (2.36)  -1.23***  (2.81)  -0.99**  (2.10)  -1.04**  (2.23) 
l |Skill diff.|  -0.10  (1.56)  -0.12***  (3.08)  -0.11***  (2.74)  -0.10***  (2.60)  -0.11  (1.60)  -0.13**  (3.14)  -0.13***  (3.11)  -0.13***  (3.00) 
Tradech*skilld
2  1.15***  (3.56)  -0.48***  (2.72)  -0.42**  (2.43)  -0.60***  (3.44)  1.18***  (3.61)  -0.45**  (2.50)  0.04  (0.24)  -0.10  (0.55) 
|GDPd|*|Skilld|  -7e
-08**  (2.36)  -3e
-09  (0.40)  -2e
-10  (0.03)  -3e
-09  (0.64)  -7e
-08***  (3.62)  -3.3e
-09  (0.52)  -2.2e
-09  (0.40)  -8.7e
-09  (1.51) 
l distance      -1.38***  (14.68)  -1.46***  (11.47)  -1.02***  (14.33)      -1.34***  (15.02)  -1.61***  (12.44)  -1.16***  (14.90) 
                                 
Weighted Third 
Country Var. 
     
                         
l W GDP  0.57  (0.42)  4.76***  (9.33)  5.23***  (9.91)      0.66  (0.50)  4.61***  (9.20)  5.43***  (10.41)     
l W Sim. Index  -1.49**  (2.13)  -2.23***  (4.13)  -3.56***  (5.63)      -1.23*  (1.77)  -1.97***  (3.78)  -3.25***  (4.77)     
l W Cap.Ratio  3.40***  (3.56)  2.69***  (3.08)  2.95***  (4.96)      3.48***  (3.69)  2.87***  (3.47)  2.79***  (4.69)     
l W |Skill diff.|  0.03  (0.35)  0.20**  (2.19)  0.23**  (2.30)      -0.03  (0.33)  0.20**  (2.15)  0.31***  (2.96)     
l W Trade cost host  0.56  (0.61)  -2.76**  (2.51)  -4.95***  (3.69)      0.54  (0.60)  -2.15**  (2.08)  -4.13***  (3.09)     
Spatial autocorr. ()  0.19***  (6.36)  0.16***  (4.93)  0.60***  (33.98)  0.58***  (32.43)  0.09***  (8.56)  0.01  (0.62)  0.15***  (21.35)  0.16***  (22.49) 
                                 
R
2  0.26  0.25  0.63  0.62  0.26  0.23  0.58  0.57 
F-stat/LL  -7745  -11786  -12028  -12097  -7743  -11791  -12243  -12313 

2  1.51  5.10  5.03  5.18  1.51  5.23  5.61  5.81 




    
   
Table 3: Random Effects and GM- Estimation on Outward FDI Stock: Spatial Expansion, Spatially and Time-wise Correlated Errors.  
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Outward FDI. 1994-2004. 
   
Random Effects Estimation 
GM-Estimation, Spatially 
correlated Errors  Random Effects Estimation 
GM-Estimation, Spatially 
correlated Errors 
                   
Bilateral Variables               
l GDP sum    3.13***  (11.57)  3.19***  (19.27)  2.88***  (11.90)  2.66***  (17.95) 
l Sim. Index    0.98***  (3.20)  1.17***  (6.96)  0.76***  (2.64)  0.81***  (5.06) 
l Cap.Ratio.    -0.08  (0.40)  -0.30***  (2.64)  0.68***  (3.69)  0.23**  (2.22) 
l Trade cost host    -1.01***  (3.28)  -1.25***  (5.03)  -0.90***  (3.03)  -0.82***  (3.71) 
l Trade cost orig.    -0.60  (1.44)  -1.13***  (4.39)  -0.80*  (1.93)  -0.85***  (3.09) 
l Fin. Risk host    -0.31  (0.86)  1.48***  (3.21)  -0.29  (0.80)  1.75***  (3.70) 
l |Skill diff.|    -0.08  (0.90)  0.04  (0.55)  -0.13  (1.46)  -0.08  (0.95) 
Tradech*skilld
2    0.97***  (2.89)  0.28  (0.98)  0.66*  (1.91)  0.16  (0.54) 
|GDPd|*|Skilld|    -5.5e
-08**  (2.47)  -2.1e
-08*  (1.70)  3.3e
-08*  (1.81)  -2.0e
-08  (1.48) 
l distance    -1.81***  (7.13)  -1.81***  (12.50)  -0.81***  (4.64)  -0.64***  (6.14) 
                   
Weighted Third Country Var.               
l W GDP    0.54  (0.88)  1.50***  (3.48)         
l W Sim. Index    -0.86***  (2.66)  -0.47***  (2.74)         
l W Cap.Ratio    3.85***  (8.52)  3.91***  (13.31)         
l W |Skill diff.|    0.30***  (3.25)  0.73***  (9.15)         
l W Trade cost host    1.25  (1.48)  -0.72  (1.12)         
Spatial autocorr. ()      0.097        0.134   
                   
2
vv      1.51    4.34    1.51    4.59   
2
11      3.22    31.05    3.36    33.61   
Note: Absolute robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance in the 10, 5 and 1% -level respectively 
The GM-estimation does not provide a significance level for the spatial autocorrelation like the MLE  
      
Table 3A: GM- Estimation on Outward FDI Stock: Spatial Expansion, Spatially and Time-wise Correlated Errors.  
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Outward FDI. 1994-2004. 
    GM-Estimation, 
parsimonious model  
GM-Estimation, 
parsimonious model  
GM-Estimation, Row 
normalized weights  
GM-Estimation, Row 
normalized weights 
                   
Bilateral Variables               
l GDP sum    2.57***  (17.04)  3.10***  (18.78)  1.97***  (12.36)  2.69***  (14.93) 
l Sim. Index    0.76***  (4.66)  1.13***  (6.59)  0.46***  (2.98)  0.88***  (5.17) 
l Cap.Ratio.    0.28***  (2.71)  -0.28**  (2.42)  0.03  (0.75)  -0.26**  (2.42) 
l Trade cost host    -0.69***  (3.14)  -1.20***  (4.77)  -0.29  (1.33)  -0.99***  (4.00) 
l Trade cost orig.    -0.76***  (2.74)  -1.06***  (4.09)  0.28  (0.87)  -0..38  (1.31) 
l Fin. Risk host            1.40***  (3.05)  1.22***  (2.69) 
l |Skill diff.|    -0.08  (1.01)  0.04  (0.46)  -0.05  (0.65)  0.03  (0.43) 
Tradech*skilld
2    0.17  (2.89)  0.31  (1.10)  -0.004  (0.01)  0.03  (0.09) 
|GDPd|*|Skilld|    -1.6e
-08  (1.31)  -1.9e
-08  (1.57)  1.1e
-08  (0.88)  -1.4 e
-08  (1.12) 
l distance    -0.61***  (5.73)  -1.83***  (12.39)  -0.61***  (6.09)  -1.64***  (11.50) 
                   
Weighted Third Country Var.               
l W GDP        1.41***  (3.24)      1.57***  (3.73) 
l W Sim. Index        -0.43**  (2.47)      -0.25  (1.45) 
l W Cap.Ratio        3.94***  (13.26)      3.27***  (9.94) 
l W |Skill diff.|        0.72***  (9.01)      0.68***  (8.68) 
l W Trade cost host      -0.68  (1.04)      -1.22*  (1.90) 
Spatial autocorr. ()  0.137    0.099    0.51    0.41   
                   
2
vv      4.46    4.23    4.29    4.15   
2
11      34.92    32.25    29.24    27.75   
Note: Absolute robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance in the 10, 5 and 1% -level respectively 
The GM-estimation does not provide a significance level for the spatial autocorrelation like the MLE    
   
APPENDIX A 
Covariance Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of main explanatory variable 


















l GDP sum  1                       
l Sim. Index  -0.68  1                     
l Cap.Ratio.  -0.05  0.05  1                   
l Trade cost h  0.32  -0.11  0.15  1                 
l Trade cost o.  0.57  -0.41  0.07  0.01  1               
l Fin. Risk host  -0.10  0.04  0.36  0.14  -0.08  1             
l |Skill diff.|  0.02  -0.03  0.25  0.10  0.06  0.10  1           
l W GDP  -0.08  0.17  -0.46  -0.55  -0.09  -0.38  -0.18  1         
l W Sim. Ind  0.25  0.11  0.31  0.51  0.02  0.21  0.09  -0.26  1       
l W Cap.R.  0.05  -0.08  0.58  0.40  0.05  0.39  0.15  -0.84  0.31  1     
l W |Skill diff.|  -0.04  0.01  -0.38  -0.24  0.04  -0.22  -0.13  0.45  -0.25  -0.69  1   
l W Trade cost. h.  -0.03  0.08  -0.49  -0.43  0.03  -0.47  -0.17  0.88  -0.32  -0.91  0.68  1 
    Test for restrictions of country dummies 
  Mean  Max  Min  St. Dev.           
l rfdi  6.51  12.74  -11.51  4.00           
l GDP sum  13.93  16.57  11.50  1.14    Likelihood-ratio test    LR 
2(16)   =624.32 
l Sim. Index  -1.39  -0.69  -4.55  0.80    (Assumption: 5 nested in 4)    Prob> 
2  =0 
l Cap.Ratio.  0.50  3.71  -1.11  0.95    Likelihood-ratio test    LR 
2 (379)=  =4101.51 
l Trade cost host  -4.04  -2.78  -5.23  0.53    (Assumption: 4 nested in 3)    Prob>
2  =0 
l Trade cost orig.  -4.13  -2.78  -5.23  0.51           
l Fin. Risk host  -3.67  -2.87  -3.91  0.14    F-test for valid restrictions       
l |Skill diff.|  0.51  2.12  -11.15  1.05    From Model 3 to Model 4    F(476,3028)  =13.67 
l W GDP   14.13  15.46  12.59  0.68        Prob > F  =0 
l W Sim. Index  -1.45  -0.69  -3.13  0.62    From Model 3 to Model 5    F(493,3028)  =16.88 
l W Cap.Ratio  -0.38  1.45  -2.22  0.90        Prob > F  =0 
l W |Skill diff.|  1.65  3.65  -8.74  1.72           
l W Trade cost host  -3.49  -2.31  -4.86  0.60            
    
APPENDIX B 
Expected signs of main variables depending on mode of FDI:  
  Market Access Motivations   Production Fragmentation 
Motivations 
Bilateral Variables   
l GDP sum  +  + 
l Sim. Index  +  +/- 
l Cap.Ratio  +  + 
l Trade cost host  +  - 
l Trade cost orig.  +/-  - 
l Fin. Risk host  -  - 
l |Skill diff.|  -  + 
l distance  -  - 
     
W X variables     
l W GDP   +  + 
l W Sim. Index  +  +/- 
l W Cap.Ratio  -  + 
l W |Skill diff.|  -  + 




Quick Data Appendix 
 
All real variables have 2000 as base year. 
Producer Price Indices are from the Bank of International Settlements. 
Bilateral FDI are from Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
Real Outward FDI stock is deflated by host country PPI . 
Skill is measured as the average number of schooling years for the population of 
age>25, (tyr) from the Barro-Lee dataset. Since they come in 5 year intervals we have 
made a spline extrapolation in order to obtain annual data that vary over time.  
Real GDP, and Real Openness are from PWT 6.1. Real Investment is calculated from 
PWT 6.1 by multiplying the variables rgdpl*(ki/100).  
Depreciation is assumed to be 7 %.  
The Financial Risk Index is from International Country Risk Guide. 
 
For a FDIij  
(i) denotes country of origin 
(j) denotes host country 
(k) denotes host countries other than (j) in the sample.  
and W is our distance based weighting matrix 
 





































SimX  ;    5 . 0 ; 0  SimX  
    
   
Real Capital Stock 1994: 
1993
1970
* / . on depreciati head Invest R  
Capital Stock at time t = Capital Stock (t-1)*depreciation + Real Investment at time t.  












Skill difference: |Skillorigin – Skillhost| 
 
W Skill D. |Skillhost,j – W Skillhosts, k| 
 
Trade Cost: 1/Real Openness 
 
Investment Cost: 1/Financial Risk Index  
 
Great Circle Distances between Capital Cities was obtained from 
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/capitals.htm  
 
W GDP: is WGDPk for the FDI stock from country(i) in country(j)  
 




Countries of Origin: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA 
 
Countries of Destination: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK, USA, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines.  
 
 
 
 
 